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The purpose of this article is not to undermine the honest efforts to 
improve natural conditions on this planet - efforts that we might place 
generically under the category of “environmental engineering.” I do in- 
tend, however, to speak against the absolutization of technological 
thinking, the belief that the only way of improving our environmental 
condition is through technology. Such technological reductionism sug- 
gests that there is a technological fix to each and every technologically 
generated problem. The paradox is that even as we apply our technologi­
cal knowledge to solving the next environmental problem, we inadver- 
tently perpetuate the very technological absolutism that caused the 
problem in the first place. The problem of waste, for instance, has be- 
come almost exclusively a technological problem, and the phrase “waste 
management” exposes the widespread belief that there are economically 
and technologically “efficient” ways of dealing with waste. My starting 
point, as a cultural studies scholar, is somewhat different: I want to ar- 
gue that we might benefit from a cultural analysis of our notions of 
cleanliness and dirt, purity and contamination.
The problem of waste may be seen in the context of what in the hu- 
man Sciences has come to be known as “the project of modernity”, i.e. the 
creation of the modern (European) cultural paradigm. Arguably, part of 
this project is the drive toward purification, sanitization and hygieni- 
zation, which is reflected in - among other things - the construction of 
the modern self or the way we place ourselves vis-B-vis the world. The 
Cartesian, “pure” self of the modern paradigm envisioned a world re- 
duced to empty, homogenous, geometrical space filled with well-defined 
objects caught in gravitational fields. Looking beyond the “filth” of mate­
riał existence, the modern subject projects a world of absolute, infinite
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transparency: the immaterial, thinking “I” imagines itself in the like- 
ness of a ray of light that “pierces” through the opaque world in its unin- 
hibited straight-line trajectory. In what might be called “the ultimate 
hygienics of existence” the subject seeks perfectly noiseless, frictionless 
channels by ignoring the medium in which anything at all can occur. In 
its abstraction from its actual positionality, the “I” (the self-transparent 
figurę, graphically and conceptually equivalent to “one”) becomes invisi- 
ble to itself, it usurps the voyeuristic position of a transparent “eye/I,” 
separated from and invisible to the ground from which it takes its very 
existence.
To narrow down our perspective, let us have a quick a look at the con- 
text of the current ecological debate. The two main camps in this debate 
are the nostalgie “unrealists” who crave for a non- (or pre-) technological 
futurę and the “realists” who embrace technology’s promises of liberation. 
Eco-sentimentalists believe in the what-might-be, in the redemptive re- 
versibility of current trends, while techno-realists profess - morę or less 
happily - that things have gone too far and faced as we are with techno­
logical realities, we should endeavour to make the best use of the present 
circumstances for a morę (ethically and economically) sustainable futurę. 
I do not mean to maintain that the polarized model of eco-sentimentalism 
and techno-progressivism as the end-points in a spectrum of intermediate 
positions provides a comprehensive description of all ecological stances. 
Anthony Weston, one of the leading American eco-philosophers, embraces 
a version of eco-nostalgia that reiterates the dream of a pre-technological 
world, whereas the ideas propagated by various trans- and post-human- 
ists exemplify techno-enthusiastic millenarianism.
Weston expounds his philosophy most fully in Back to Earth: Tomor- 
row’s Enoironmentalism, a book whose very title epitomizes Weston’s 
approach. If the first part of the title suggests a regressive step back, the 
subtitle tells us to look forward into the futurę. Words such as “return” 
or “restore” recur throughout the book, and the plea Weston sets out to 
make could well be summarized in his favourite phrase “coming back to 
our senses” in its double meaning: “changing the way we perceive 
things” and at the same time “redressing the balance of the mind”
If bright lights outside were also disallowed [...] [t]he heaviness of the night could re­
turn. [...] The stars could return, and the light creatures now exiled by the light.
This is not a utopian proposal. Unplug a few outdoor lights, reroute some roads, and in 
some places of the country we have a first approximation, even when the electricity is 
on [Weston, 1994, 114-5].
Much as one might believe in the positive results of such actions, mo- 
ving beyond the mediation of technology remains a regressivist dream: it
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is easier to unplug a few outdoor lights than to unplug the self from the 
technologies it depends on.1 The key ąuestion, rather, is which (or 
whose) technology we choose, what kinds of technology are allowed to 
mediate our perception and self-perception - and this is where Weston’s 
campaign against technological determinism becomes fully relevant.
In an insightful essay on self-validating reduction (a sort of “self-fulfil- 
ling prophecy”) in our thinking, Weston takes issue with those who 
charge ecologists with nostalgie sentimentalism by ironically agreeing 
with them:
So let us embrace unrealism. [...] Even to ourselves, and especially to our studenta, we 
sound sentimental, romantic, softheaded, and utopian. My current suggestion is that 
we should. We speak for what the world might be, perhaps for what it once was — not 
necessarily for what it is right now. [Weston, 1996, 130]
Weston [1996, 130] argues convincingly that “our attention ought to be 
directed toward re-valuational possibilities, toward overlooked openings, 
toward the manifold hidden possibilities of things.” Like many other so- 
phisticated eco-thinkers of our times, he calls for a radical change in our 
perception, a re-visioning of the world around us. Yet through a stubborn 
rejection of technology and its threat of reductionism, are not some ecolo­
gists themselves overlooking certain openings and hidden possibilities of 
things? Arguably, any opening of new fields of vision happens necessarily 
at the cost of a narrowing or closure of other fields, so those who bemoan 
technology’s domination (and its diminishing effects) may simply be too 
short-sighted to see its liberating potential. Digital technologies are be- 
lieved to open new perceptual domains, just as the telescope and the mi- 
croscope changed profoundly our optics in their time.
The new fields of vision and other possibilities offered by technology 
have been appropriated and apotheosized by a host of techno-proselytes, 
prophets of a “brave new age”. An extreme example of the dream of tech­
nological salvation can be found in various versions of trans-humanism. 
We are now at a moment of transition, trans-humanists maintain, from 
a lower, merely human, evolutionary phase to a higher, “post-human” 
one. Thanks to modern science and technology, intelligent life is moving 
beyond its human limitations by means of all the technological self-en- 
hancements available. Futurę post-humans will be persons of unlimited 
physical, intellectual, and psychological capacity, self-programming, 
self-constituting, and potentially immortal. One branch of trans-hu- 
manist philosophy, which calls itself extropianism, emphasizes growth 
and self-organization (i.e. the principle of extropy, opposed to that of
*As I argue elsewhere, modern subjectivity is always co-produced by technology.
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entropy). In typically techno-progressivist parlance, extropians declare 
that they seek to remove all political, cultural, biological, and psycholo- 
gical limits to self-actualization and self-realization [Morę, 1999].2
2My discussion of extropianism is based on Max Morę, “The Extropian Principles: 
A Transhumanist Declaration” [1999], available at http://www.extropy.org/extprn3.htm.
Here, following Morę [1999], as elsewhere, the story of transcendence 
is combined with the paradigm of progress and “new frontier” rhetoric. 
The first principle of extropianism reads “Perpetual Progress” based on 
rational optimism and a program of unrestrained self-improvement in 
all possible areas of life. Through science and technology, extropians 
seek “to transcend ‘natural’ limits imposed by our biological heritage, 
culture, and environment [Ibid.].” Indeed, “natural limits” do not exist, 
human naturę is infinitely malleable and open to constant reshaping 
and self-transcending. Technology leads us to believe that no constraints 
should be taken for granted: “We challenge the inevitability of aging and 
death [Ibid.],” extropians proclaim proudly. In its denial of the body, or 
even the whole physical realm, technology promises an immaterial world 
of pure light and thought, a kingdom of the mind freed from the awk- 
ward opacity of corporeality. Technological fix is a panacea for all our 
problems: “Intelligent use of biotechnology and nanotechnology and the 
opening of new frontiers in space, can remove resource constraints and 
discharge environmental pressures [Ibid.].” Apparently, technology’s 
telos is to turn the materiał world into an insignificant footnote, 
a side-effect or, indeed, waste. The problem of waste must be seen not 
just as a ąuestion of disposal, but morę fundamentally as a question of 
how not to think of the whole physical universe (including human bo- 
dies) in terms of technology’s waste.
Galway KinnelTs poem “The Fundamental Project of Technology” (1985) 
might serve as an apt, if ironie, comment on the sort of techno-idealism 
outlined above. Inspired by the Nagasaki tragedy, the poem declares:
To de-animalize human mentality, to purge it of obsolete 
evolutionary characteristics, in particular of death, 
which foreknowledge terrorizes the contents of skulls with, 
is the fundamental project of technology; however, 
pseudologica fantastica’s mechanisms reąuire: 
to establish deathlessness it is necessary to eliminate 
those who die; a task attempted, when a white flash sparkled. [Kinnell, 1994, 2656]
The project of technology came to its logical conclusion - or its telos - 
with the construction of a weapon of total destruction. The luring promise 
of absolute transcendence lies in the possibility of an ultimate, indisputable 
erasure, perfect non-existence. Thus, unchecked technological fundamen-
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talism may turn out to be a suicidal enterprise. The drive to transcend is 
married, again, to the dream of ultimate, bodiless purity that only effective 
annihilation can guarantee. Total destruction becomes the best hygienic 
means to purge the mind of fear, and the body — of natural death.
The same impulse to repudiate the corporeal and the mortal can be 
discerned in John Perry Barlow’s “Declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace”3 (which, by the way, was criticized from extropian posi- 
tions4). With the zeal of a Lenin, Barlow envisions a universal revolution 
that will overthrow the “Governments of the Industrial World, [...] 
weary giants of flesh and steel,” except this time the driving force is not 
the proletariat, but internet technology. Characteristically, flesh and 
steel are brought together at the level of “hardware,” so as to connote 
heaviness, clumsiness, and datedness; both need to be rejected for the 
sake of a high-tech “civilization of the Mind” where there is no matter 
and identities have no bodies. Yet, somehow, Barlow is able to maintain 
that cyberspace is “an act of naturę” that “grows itself through our col- 
lective actions.” It is probably one of the most extreme examples of the 
appropriation of the notion of naturę; what Barlow means, supposedly, 
is that the dynamics of the growth of cyberspace is comparable, in its 
spontaneity and complexity, to the growth of organie bodies or ecosy- 
stems. At the background of Barlow’s eulogy there lurks the idea that 
cyberspace is an extension of natural evolutionary progress.
3Available at http://www.wired.com/wired/if7declaration.
4Cf. Reilly Jones, “A Critique of Barlow’s ‘A Declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace’” at http://www.extropy.org/eo/discrim/17jones.htm.
5 This entails, of course, that cyberspace is a realm outside history, sińce it is only 
noise, loss, entropy that leaves a mark and thus makes all history possible.
The core of the cyberspace myth seems to lie in the belief that it is 
a realm of sheer profit. Barlow stresses that in cyberspace “whatever the 
human mind may create can be reproduced and distributed infinitely at 
no cost.” It is nothing but a capitalists’ dream of “minimum input, maxi- 
mum output” come true. Overlooking the obvious fact that Computer 
technologies are extremely costly, cyberspace zealots describe it in terms 
of a perpetuum mobile, an inexhaustible machinę with zero degree en- 
tropy.5 Commenting on this allegedly “infinite” productivity of cyber­
space Robert Markley points out:
Cyberspace [...] is an attempt to deny or repress the interpenetrating histories of labor, 
economic investment, technological development, and ecological wear and tear that re- 
sults from a society still dependent on nonrenewable resources for its sources of energy 
and economic and political power. [Markley, 1996, 75]
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While concealing its ultimate dependence on physical resources as 
well as its ecological and socio-political contexts, cyberspace produces 
a myth of “no pain, all gain,” the finał fulfillment of technology’s promise 
of absolute efficiency and optimization.
It is against the usurped transparency of technology that an ecological 
thinker of today should argue. This ethos of transparency is clearly to be 
found in Information technologies. Robert Markley States that
the promises that technology offers - pleasure, plenty and self-actualization - ironi- 
cally render it transparent: the purpose of technology, in this respect, is to re-create an 
enhanced version of natural existence. [...] Cyberspace promises to take us beyond the 
interventions of technology - ironically, only by repressing those interventions, by ef- 
facing the technologies on which it depends [Markley, 1996, 72-3],
Just as the longing for a “wilderness experience” masked the drive to 
escape beyond the painful sphere of history, so technology - and particu- 
larly Virtual Reality technology - promises new lands, seemingly free 
from the painful ecological realities of today. In Bill Bryant’s straightfor- 
ward formulation,
The technologies of Information age [...] seem to point away from the dirty, materiał 
world of minerals and machinery, fuel and smoke, flesh and bonę, toward a pristine, 
dematerialized territory of codes and programs and virtuality set apart from the natu­
ral environment. The Information age makes it easy to forget that the world still runs 
in fossil fuels, Chemical pesticides and smokestack Industries [Bryant, 2000].
The ecological paradigm, as I describe it below, helps counter the 
ethos of transparency with that of “opacity,” where opacity stands, ge- 
nerally, for the principle of loss and entropy, wear and breakdown.
A careful re-examination of technology must recognize both its totali- 
tarian impulse (the drive to appropriate human presence in the world at 
the subtlest, imperceptible, i.e. perceptual, level) and its potential for 
liberation. It is technology, after all, that emancipated us (partly, at 
least) from the constraints of purely “biological” existence. Once we dis- 
avow any allegiance to the Western techno-eschatologism, which prom­
ises a brave new world of technologically sustained spiritual “freedom,” 
we may start negotiating the real gains and losses of introducing parti- 
cular technologies. Donna Haraway’s work is exemplary in this respect. 
Technologies - particularly Computer technologies — always remain an 
open question (despite strong “regularizing” forces that prescribe parti- 
cular uses of the devices), an area of contest. Significantly, the (military) 
power arrangements that madę possible the invention of cyberspace, did 
not - indeed, could not - foresee its uses or social consequences. Al- 
though technology seems to have achieved the “escape velocity” which
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promises to take us out of the Earth’s gravitational field into the digital 
heaven of “no pain, all gain,” maturę ecology must resist the lure of this 
escapist dream and seek instead new metaphorical spaces for us to dwell 
in. My contention is that we need a new ecological ethics that would 
counter the ethos of technology.
As part of this “new ecology” I propose to introduce the notion of resi- 
due. The notion of “residue” might prove useful in revisioning the morę 
traditional modes of perception and action. Although the modern self 
could never ultimately deny its functional dependence on the matter and 
energy exchanges between the body and its environment (e.g. in food 
Processing), it could dream its spiritual, mental or intellectual detach- 
ment, predicated on the assumed “purity” of seeing. If the notion of resi­
due poses no conceptual difficulty when it refers, say, to the body’s re- 
tention of nutrients extracted from food, it may be less obvious when it 
comes to perception and the construction of subjectivity. In simple 
terms, there is always a tracę of the context in the self, or morę gene- 
rally - a residue of ground in the figurę; there is always an influx of 
ground into the figurę and an efflux of figurę into the ground. Existence 
is leaky by naturę.
The above insights parallel Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on the naturę 
of the relationship between man and the world, developed into a theory 
of world-flesh and the chiasm (or “the intertwining”). Consciousness and 
naturę, the body and the world “slip” or “flow” into each other in what 
might be called reciprocal interpenetration or mutual incorporation. As 
Douglas Low [2000, 41] puts it, consciousness “is intertwined with the 
body, which is intertwined with the world.” Merleau-Ponty himself 
wrote:
Where are we to put the limit between the body and the world, sińce the world is flesh? 
[...] The world seen is not “in” my body, and my body is not “in” the visible world 
ultimately: as flesh applied to a flesh, the world neither surrounds it nor is surrounded 
by it. [...] There is reciprocal insertion and intertwining of one in the other 
[Merleau-Ponty, 1968, 138].
Thus Merleau-Ponty creates “an ontology of regions that slip into one 
another and overlap” [Low, 2000, 49], in contrast with the classical 
Western ontology based on an alchemy of mutual exclusions, whose ulti- 
mate aim is a perfect “purification” of distinct and separate entities, 
such as “pure” wilderness perceived by a “pure” self, free of any techno- 
logical contamination. As far as the “construction” of the self is con- 
cerned, Donna Haraway counters the old dream of purity (and clarity) 
with her brave new “cyborg myth,” which blends the human with the 
technological and “advocate[s] pollution [Haraway, 1991, 176].”
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The notion of residue invalidates the dangerous longing for absolute 
purity and leads straight to a revaluation of contamination. The inspira- 
tion for such a shift in perspective may again be derived from 
Merleau-Ponty, on whose account “naturę cannot be adequately con- 
ceived as a pure thing in itself over against a pure consciousness for it- 
self [Low, 2000, 38].” Instead, the two constantly permeate or, in my ter- 
minology, contaminate one another. This notion is largely incompatible 
with the traditional American philosophy of wilderness, as envisioned by 
nineteenth-century transcendentalists. In his analysis of Emerson’s Na­
turę, for instance, Tadeusz Rachwał [1997, 76-7] delineates the forma- 
tion of the self/centre from the position of which “the world is but a con­
tamination of the absolute, ‘the sordor and filths of naturę’ to be dried 
up by the sun [...]”. The dirt of materiał naturę is too much for the puri- 
fied subject, who imagines a pure, absolute realm behind the “sordor and 
filth” of the visible. Arguably, the very same posturę underlies the enter- 
prise of modern technology, whose ultimate aim - as I have pointed out 
earlier - is to transform the world into waste, a disposable by-product, 
garbage. Works such as A. R. Ammons’s justly renowned poem-book 
Garbage undertake the difficult task of reconceptualizing the notion of 
garbage - not as something that needs to be neatly disposed of, i.e. 
moved to a place where it cannot be seen, but as “the poem of our time 
[...] believable enough / to get our attention, getting in the way, piling / 
up, stinking [...]” [1993, 18].
My program of revaluating “opacity” begins with the body as the 
opaque aspect of our presence in the world, largely disregarded by the 
classical, spiritualized “self’ in its transcendentalist chase after the be- 
yond. As Merleau-Ponty reminds us, it is the body, not the disembodied 
and transparent soul that perceives the world. The age-old Christian 
longing for de-corporealization almost becomes feasible in the technolo- 
gical fantasies of today. Without denouncing technology as such, a “new 
ecology” should work against the technological dreams of de-corporeali­
zation: the body cannot dissolve into cyberspace without a tracę, leaving 
the pure mind as an interminable site of personal identity. We must pro- 
tect the hardware (the awkward, the opaque, the fallible) against the 
despotic claims of the software. Indeed, we need to question the distinc- 
tion itself, otherwise we will remain in the old school of thinking “mind” 
as housed in the disposable Container of the body. If the ecological poli- 
tics of reinhabitation is to succeed, we must first of all reinhabit our own 
fallible bodies.
Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s ecology allied itself with the 
cult of the “fit body” and a devotion to wholesome food. However, the un- 
derlying principle of this “health-culture” has, arguably, been derived
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from the ethos of a well-working machinę or, morę fundamentally, from 
the economy of efficiency which aims at minimizing loss and maximizing 
gain. The totalizing regime of health (wholeness, holiness) has been 
grounded in “naturę,” that is a discourse which appropriates the notion 
of “naturalness” as a legitimization of social norm. “It is not surprising, 
then,” as Neil Evernden [1992, 22] notes, “that naturę is used in adver- 
tising much as it is in the promotion of a new morality or world-view: as 
a visible manifestation of normalcy and health.” Even if the body as such 
is opaąue, it may be subjected to a regulating “health-regime” and forced 
to work as smoothly and noiselessly as possible. The body, however, has 
its own points of opacity: pain, disease, death. The modern self, residing 
in the quiet refuge of its own consciousness, assumes transparency that 
presumably allows it to penetrate the world to its utmost limits (and be- 
yond), except that death proves an impenetrable membranę, after all. 
Much of the Wesfs spiritual and technological quest has been propelled 
by the fantasy that even if the body is too “thick” for the membranę, 
some ethereal soul at least can pass through. The cyberspace myth, 
which simply perpetuates the same old fantasy, offers a false solution: 
the mind may be believed to be entering a new dimension, but the body 
is still too dense to pass through the digital filters.
A well-working machinę cannot claim “a story”: a mundane repea- 
tability of an unchanging pattern can leave no mark, no tracę, no record. 
A story begins when the machinę breaks down, at the point of the ma- 
chine’s (or the selfs, or the body’s, or nature’s) opacity. Thus the ethics 
that would effectively undermine the ethos of technology must originate 
from a proper recognition of loss, wear-and-tear, finitude. In order to 
counter the Cartesian ontology of “elear and distinct” objects, we should 
emphasize the opaque and the blurred, the indistinct and the inter- 
twined. We need to relinquish the dream of the selfs and the world’s ab- 
solute legibility, anchored in the belief in our presumably unlimited ca- 
pacities as “interpreters.” Such a new, ecological “ethics of opacity” 
would advocate specificity, locality, diversity. It would concentrate on 
that which cannot be subsumed, reduced, ignored, erased. It would pay 
attention to the medium, because nothing can exist outside of it. It 
would emphasize ground rather than figurę, finitude rather than perma- 
nence, contamination rather than purity, opacity rather than transpa­
rency, porosity rather than impermeability, loss rather than gain. 
Re-thinking waste (particularly in relation to technology) must be an es- 
sential part of this ambitious (and possibly utopian) long-term program.
Ineffective waste management is one of the many effects of the domi- 
nation of what I cali “the ethos of technology,” an ethos whose ultimate 
aim seems to be absolute cleansing. But my plea is not for making waste
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management simply morę efficient according to long-established rules, 
but rather it is a plea for changing the very terms of the debate. It is not 
enough, for instance, to say that garbage should be valued as a product, 
sińce such a statement is still deeply embedded in the techno-capitalist 
philosophy of frugality, proper use, efficiency etc. - the kind of mentality 
I have been trying to problematize. The ethics of opacity (possibly based 
on a Merleau-Pontian ontology of the chiasni), just as I have outlined it 
above, may serve as a starting point for an attempt to change the terms 
of the debate and develop a new relationship with the world - a relation- 
ship which will make the world not simply “cleaner” (i.e. morę efficiently 
controlled, manipulated and cleansed by various technologies), but morę 
livable in all respects.
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